HAMPTON, GA, USA
N3381P
PIPER PA-23-160
WITNESSES HEARD THE LEFT ENGINE SPUTTERING DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL, AND WATCHED AS THE AIRPLANE BECAME AIRBORNE, VEERED TOWARD THE LEFT, STALLED, AND IMPACTED THE GROUND. THE PILOT HAD FLOWN TO THE AIRPORT FOR RADIO WORK. WHILE THE AIRPLANE WAS PARKED ON THE RAMP FOR TWO HOURS, THERE WAS HARD RAIN. THE AIRPLANE WAS THEN TAXIED TO THE FBO AND FUELED. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT TAKEOFF, THE LEFT ENGINE QUIT. NO WATER WAS FOUND IN THE REFUELING TRUCK AND OTHER AIRCRAFT WERE FUELED FROM IT BEFORE AND AFTER THE ACCIDENT WITH NO DISCREPANCIES REPORTED. THE POST ACCIDENT EXAMINATION OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED WATER IN BOTH ENGINE FUEL PUMPS. THE THERMOS TYPE FUEL CAPS OF BOTH MAIN TANKS WERE FOUND LOOSE, AND THE SEALS CRACKED. AN AD REQUIRES THE FUEL CAPS TO BE INSPECTED ANNUALLY. THE AIRCRAFT LOG INDICATES THAT THE INSPECTION WAS DONE ABOUT ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT.
On July 11, 1994, about 1413 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-23-160, N3381P, collided with the ground during a forced landing at Tara Field, Clayton County Airport, Hampton, Georgia. The airplane was operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91, and visual flight rules. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. There were serious injuries to the commercial pilot and substantial damage to the airplane. The flight to Smyrna, Tennessee, was originating from runway 24, at the time of the accident. Witnesses stated that the engines sputtered after the airplane had lifted off and climbed to about 75 feet above the ground. The airplane then descended rapidly. Damage to the airplane indicated a 30 degree nose and left wing down impact, according to inspectors who examined the wreckage. The pilot stated that he had flown the airplane to Tara Field the same morning. A navigation radio was serviced at Precision Avionics. He remained at the airport about two hours. During the time the airplane was on the ramp at Tara Field, while the radio was being serviced, witnesses reported that there were periods of hard rain. The pilot then taxied the airplane to the fixed base operator (FBO) for fueling. FBO personnel said that refueling of the airplane was delayed about 20 minutes, waiting for rain to subside. The airplane was then fueled with 43.6 gallons of 100LL aviation gasoline. According to the fueler, the fuel was distributed between both main fuel tanks. He stated that it was not raining during the fueling. The fueler noted that the thermos type fuel cap of the left main tank was looser than the cap for the right main tank. Another FBO employee observed that the pilot performed a walk- around inspection of the airplane before departing. She did not note if the pilot took fuel samples from the airplane. The pilot could not recall any of the events after the airplane had been fueled. A witness reported to a police investigator that the engine was "spitting and sputtering" during the takeoff roll. It reached about 75 feet above the ground, "shot straight up and then did a chandell just prior to impact." The airplane impacted level terrain about 615 feet south of the runway. It came to rest, upright, on a southerly heading. The landing gear was extended and one blade of each propeller was bent rearward. Both opposing blades were straight. The first emergency medical technician who arrived at the crashed airplane said that he found both fuel selectors locked in the main tank position, and moved them to the off position. He did not note the position of the throttle quadrant controls, and they were inadvertently moved during his treatment of the injured pilot. A post accident examination of the fuel truck did not reveal any abnormalities. On July 15, 1994, at the accident site, the fuel system was examined. About one tablespoon of liquid was drained from both engine fuel pumps. The liquid had the appearance of water. Liquid was also drained from the fuel line at the left wing root. It contained what appeared to be a water globule. Both main fuel tank caps were loose in the filler neck and the rubber exhibited cracking. The left fuel tank filler cap through pin was loose, when the closing tang was in the closed position. When the tang was closed, the sealer did not visibly expand. Both carburetor bowls were empty, and both main fuel tanks were ruptured. Federal Aviation Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-21-07 R1 is applicable to the fuel caps of N3381P. The AD requires that the thermos type fuel cell caps, and the fuel filler compartment covers be inspected, in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 340, at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months. Any defects found are to be corrected prior to further flight. The purpose of the AD is to reduce the possibility of precipitation and/or wash water from entering the fuel filler compartment and leaking into the fuel cell resulting in engine failure.
THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE AIRCRAFT PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION, HIS FAILURE TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF, AND HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN AIRSPEED THAT RESULTED IN A STALL. A FACTOR WAS THE INADEQUATE AIRCRAFT INSPECTION THAT DID NOT IDENTIFY THE WORN FUEL CELL CAPS.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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