WAUSEON, OH, USA
N2372L
Beech MUSKETEER 23
The annual inspection was completed on the day of the accident, which included the installation of an overhauled engine. The pilot/co-owner hired a flight instructor for the first flight. Break in instructions for the engine were to run it for 2 hours at full throttle and mixture full rich. During takeoff the engine only produced 2,100 rpm's and the takeoff roll used 3,000 feet of the 3,800 foot runway. After flying 1 hour, the pilot landed and called the mechanic about the engine. The pilot was told that 'the timing may be off, or that the engine may still be a little tight.' The pilot then decided to fly again with the other co-owner. After another hour of flying, and during the turn to final, the engine quit. The pilot performed a forced landing to a field short of the runway. After the accident, a witness turned the fuel selector from the left tank to the off position. Only unusable fuel was found in the left wing tank, and the right wing tank was about 1/2 to 3/4 of full. Additionally, no fuel was found in the lines to the carburetor, and only residual fuel was in the engine driven fuel pump. The pilot's total flight experience was 84 hours.
On August 30, 1997, approximately 2005 eastern daylight time, a Beech Musketeer 23, N2372L, was substantially damaged when it impacted the ground during a forced landing to the Fulton County Airport, Wauseon, Ohio. The certificated private pilot/co-owner and the student pilot rated passenger/co-owner received minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the personal local flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The annual inspection and the installation of the recently overhauled engine was completed the day of the accident. The pilot/co-owner hired a certificated flight instructor (CFI) for the initial flight. The pilot stated that the mechanic briefed him on the break-in procedures for the overhauled engine. His instructions were to fly for 2 hours at full throttle and full rich mixture. He stated that he was told to "start the engine, do no run-up, check the magnetos, fuel, oil, controls, and go." During the take off, the engine only produced 2,100 rpm's, and the take-off roll took approximately 3,000 feet of the 3,800 foot long runway. Once airborne, they remained in the local vicinity, and the CFI was able to attain 2,300 rpm's after leaning the mixture. After circling the airport for an hour, the pilot landed and talked to the mechanic about the engine. The pilot recalled that the mechanic stated that "the timing might be off, or that the engine may still be a little tight." Eager to take the other owner flying in their new airplane, the pilot decided to fly. The CFI, who had flown with the pilot on the first flight told the pilot to fill the left fuel tank before the flight. The pilot stated that he did not want to because of the rpm problem. The two owners took off and remained in the vicinity of the airport for an hour. They entered the traffic pattern, and during the turn to final at 1,500 feet MSL. the pilot reported that "the engine quit." With plenty of altitude and while lining up for the runway, the pilot wrote, "the strangest thing happened, the prop quit wind milling. The airplane dropped out (of the sky) and pancaked in a bean field short of the runway." A Federal Aviation Administration Inspector examined the airplane on August 31, 1997. He reported that the airplane incurred major structural damage to the left and right wing spars where the main landing gear attached. After removing the refueling caps, he was able to see 1/2 to 3/4 capacity in the right tank, and no visible fuel in the left wing tank. The fuel selector was in the off position. A witness reported to the FAA Inspector that after the accident, he turned the fuel selector off as a precaution. The witness stated that the fuel selector was in the left tank position. No further inspection of the airplane was possible due to its position in the bean field. The airplane was secured in a hangar by the airport manager, and the Inspector returned on September 22, 1997, to continue his examination. The left wing fuel tank was drained and an estimated quantity of less than 4 liters of fuel was found. The engine driven fuel pump was disconnected and a residual amount of fuel was found. The Inspector manually activated the pump and good suction was observed. No fuel was found in the fuel lines to the carburetor, and no other defects noted. The pilot's statement dated October 16, 1997, contained the following: "During the first preflight check of the airplane, I saw 1/2 tank of fuel in the left wing, and almost full tank in the right wing. Prior to take off, I selected the right fuel tank since it was the fullest tank. During the second preflight, I saw 1/4 tank of fuel in the left wing, and almost full tank in the right wing. The fuel selector was still on the right tank from the previous flight. As we were turning downwind to land for the second flight, I noticed that the left fuel gauge was going on empty and the right gauge was reading full. I told the passenger, who did a cross check and found the fuel selector switch in the right wing position. The passenger thought it might be the gauges. I told him it couldn't be, because they worked fine before, and nothing was done to the gauges, but the fuel selector switch had been worked on." The mechanic reported that the pilot and his partner had taken the interior of the airplane apart prior to the annual inspection. He wrote that "the only part of the fuel selector that was out was the handle and I put the handle back on and checked the selector out. It was okay." The Federal Aviation Administration Inspector reported that the pilot did not mention the fuel selector during his investigation. The Inspector indicated that the fuel quantity recovered from the left wing tank was the unusable fuel remaining in the tank. The pilot reported 84 hours of total flight experience, of which 10 hours were in make and model.
The pilot's fuel mismanagement by his failure to switch fuel tank positions, which resulted in the fuel starvation and the loss of engine power.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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