Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary FTW98LA122

PORT LAVACA, TX, USA

Aircraft #1

N5207R

Cessna 172M

Analysis

The airplane struck power lines during an aerial observation flight. Witnesses observed the airplane flying the power line (aircraft engine at full power), enter a climbing left turn, spin to the left, and descend toward the ground. Winds were from the north at 20 gusting to 30 knots. The pilot was dispatched by the director of operations. This was the pilot's first aerial observation flight for the company. The pilot had not received company training in the type of operation. Following the accident, the director of operations said that the pilot needed 'situational awareness' when flying the power lines, and on the NTSB Form 6120.1/2 the operator recommended 'improving situational awareness and training.' The passenger/observer stated that the 'power line turned, the [air]plane didn't turn, the pilot never saw the line.' The observer reported that the engine was running fine until the airplane struck the wire. Flight control continuity was confirmed. There were no pre-impact discrepancies found with the airframe. The engine examination did not reveal any anomalies that would preclude full power engine operation prior to impact.

Factual Information

On February 6, 1998, at 1000 central standard time, a Cessna 172M airplane, N5207R, struck power lines while maneuvering near Port Lavaca, Texas. The airplane was operated by Barr Air Patrol, Inc., of Kenedy, Texas, under Title 14 CFR Part 91. The commercial pilot received serious injuries and the passenger received minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the aerial observation flight and a company flight plan was filed. The flight departed Victoria, Texas, at 0930. During personal interviews, conducted by the investigator-in-charge (IIC), and on the enclosed statements, witnesses reported observing the airplane flying the power line that paralleled Highway 35 toward Rockport, Texas. One witness stated that he heard an "aircraft motor being given full power." This witness observed the airplane enter a climbing left turn "with the motor being retarded or shut down." Another witness reported observing the airplane "pull up hard and realized that it was trying to miss the upcoming high power lines directly ahead of the [air]plane." Witnesses observed the airplane spin to the left 90 degrees, make a wide circle, and go in a downward direction toward Highway 35. The weather was overcast skies, visibility 5 to 10 miles, winds from the north at 20 to 30 mph, gusting, and a temperature of 40 degrees Fahrenheit. During telephone interviews, conducted by the IIC, and on the enclosed passenger statement, the passenger reported that he was the power line observer during the flight. He had often flown with the company; however, this was his first flight with this pilot. The power line company contracted for the flight that departed from the north runway at the Victoria Regional Airport about 0930. The flight to the power line substation was flown at 2,500 feet msl. The weather was clear with a little haze in the Victoria area and winds from the north. The observer directed the pilot to the substation where they picked up the line (#69) that paralleled Highway 35 out of Port Lavaca, Texas, toward Carbide, Texas, and on to Rockport, Texas. A 138 kilovolt tower line (taller than #69 line) paralleled #69 line and then turned 90 degrees across #69 line and Highway 35. The observer watched the #69 line for breaks in the line as the pilot flew the aircraft. The observer felt the turbulence (gusty winds) as the airplane bounced up and down and the pilot attempted to maintain altitude and track for observing the line. The passenger stated that the "power line turned, the [air]plane didn't turn, the pilot never saw the line." The observer felt the wheels hit the shield wire [non energized] of the 138 kilovolt line. The airplane jerked and then went to the left. The pilot said "thought be al[l]right" and then said "this is not good." The airplane descended at a 45 degree angle to the ground and impacted a wet plowed field at a "high speed." The observer was watching the power line and did not observe the flight instruments; however, he stated that the "engine was running fine until the airplane struck the wire." During a telephone interview, conducted by the IIC, on February 10, 1998, at 1015, the pilot stated that he had "no memory on the events." During a telephone interview, conducted by the FAA inspector, on February 19, 1998, the pilot stated that during the flight a 25 knot crosswind was experienced, which made it difficult to sustain 90 knot airspeed, and a power setting of 2,300 to 2,400 rpm. An altitude of 300 to 500 feet was maintained above the 90 feet power lines that paralleled the power lines being observed by the passenger. The observer kept requesting that the pilot fly the aircraft lower for better observation of the power line. The crosswind "kept the airplane drifting to the left of the intended heading." To maintain the airplane's flight heading, the pilot "tried to get full power and did not get any response. At this time N5207R hit the upper shield wires of the 90 feet power lines." The pilot stated that "this was his first power line observation" flight. Numerous attempts by the company, the FAA inspector, and the IIC, to obtain a written pilot statement have been to no avail. During a telephone interview on February 6, 1998, conducted by the IIC, the director of operations reported that the pilot descended the airplane to 600 feet msl for flying the power line. The wind was gusty and the pilot reported that he had to keep adding power (2,300 to 2,500 rpm) to get back over to the line and the engine was not developing the needed power. Subsequently, the airplane descended and clipped the high power line where 2 power lines intersected. During telephone interviews, conducted by the IIC, power company personnel stated that the 138 kilovolt line is approximately 90 feet agl. The shield wire (#18 wire) is composed of 7 strands for a diameter of 1/4-5/16 inch. During telephone interviews, conducted by the IIC, and on the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2), the director of operations reported that the company operates 14 aircraft and employs 12 full time pilots. The company holds a low altitude waiver and the aerial observation flights are conducted under contract with the power company during emergency power outages. On the morning of February 6, 1998, power company (Central Power & Light) personnel called for an aerial observation flight to depart Victoria, Texas, with an observer to survey for possible breaks in a power line. The director of operations dispatched the pilot for the flight. The director of operations stated that he hired the pilot approximately 6 months before the accident to work in sales and marketing and as a backup pilot for flying the aerial observation flights. The previous month, the pilot flew a company airplane to Beeville, Texas; however, this was not a power line flight. The chief pilot for the company had not flown power lines with the pilot and, the pilot had not received aerial power line observation training. The director of operations said that the pilot needed "situational awareness" when flying the power lines. On the NTSB Form 6120.1/2 the operator recommended "improving situational awarness and training." Check airmen for the company include the president/director of operations, the chief pilot, and a pilot/flight instructor. The director of operations and the FAA inspector examined the site. The observed power lines traveled on a measured magnetic heading of 230 degrees. The aircraft came to rest at a terrain elevation of 34 feet msl and a north latitude 28 degrees 35.15 minutes; west longitude 96 degrees 41.50 minutes on a measured magnetic heading of 185 degrees approximately 1,000 feet from the initial contact point. The left wing exhibited leading edge damage. Striations consistent with the cable wires were found on the left wing leading edge, the propeller, and the engine cowling. The left side of the empennage was buckled inward and the tail was bent to the left. The left main gear assembly sheared at the landing gear support bolt. Flight control continuity was established. The flap actuator screw position indicated the flaps were in the retracted position. The left fuel tank was leaking fuel and fuel was found in the gascolator. The aircraft was recovered and transported to Kenedy, Texas, for further examination. See the enclosed FAA inspector statements and diagram for additional details. On February 18, 1998, the FAA inspector and the Cessna representative examined the aircraft and the Lycoming engine (model O-320-E2D, serial number L-39527-27A). Engine continuity was confirmed. Plugs were clear of debris. During the cylinder compression check, low compression, excess ring blow-by, and exhaust valve leakage were observed. The FAA inspector stated that the "inspection did not reveal anything that would indicate engine failure prior to the accident." The Cessna representative reported that there were no pre-impact discrepancies found with the aircraft. The FAA inspector and the director of maintenance applied oil to the cylinder walls. The cylinder compression for the #1, #2, and #4 cylinders was in the 70's after oiling the cylinder walls. The #3 cylinder exhaust valve was removed and inspected. The valve guide exhibited excess clearance between the valve stem and the valve guide. The valve stem exhibited wear. The Lycoming representative stated that the engine anomalies did not preclude full power engine operation prior to impact. A review of the maintenance records for the 1974 airplane, by the FAA inspector and the IIC, did not reveal any uncorrected maintenance discrepancies. The engine was installed on June 2, 1997, and the aircraft was approved for using autogas (STC SA 1998CE). On January 26, 1998, the spark plugs were replaced with new REM40E plugs.

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the power line. Factors were the gusty winds, the pilots lack of experience in the type of operation, inadequate training and insufficient standards/requirements by the company/operator management, and the power lines.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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