MALIBU, CA, USA
N8058P
PIPER PA-24-180
THE ENGINE SUSTAINED A LOSS OF POWER DURING CRUISE FLIGHT. THE PILOT EXECUTED THE REQUIRED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES, BUT WAS UNABLE TO RESTART THE ENGINE. THE PILOT ELECTED TO DITCH THE AIRPLANE INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN ABOUT 2 MILES OFF SHORE. THE AIRPLANE SANK TO A 20 FT DEPTH AFTER THE PILOT WAS RESCUED. THE AIRPLANE WAS RETRIEVED WITH BOTH WINGS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE FUEL SYSTEMS INTACT. THE LEFT WING FUEL TANK WAS EMPTY AND THE RIGHT WING CONTAINED A MIXTURE OF ABOUT 15 GALLONS OF FUEL AND OCEAN WATER. THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE HANDLE WAS SELECTED TO THE RIGHT TANK. THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE, HOWEVER, WAS POSITIONED TOWARD THE LEFT TANK. EXAMINATION OF THE FUEL SELECTOR VALVE SHAFT REVEALED IT TO BE ROUNDED. AN ANNUAL INSPECTION HAD BEEN PERFORMED 16 FLIGHT HOURS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT.
On July 2, 1993, at 1322 hours Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA24-180, N8058P, crashed about two miles off shore at Malibu, California, after experiencing a total loss of engine power. The pilot was conducting a local visual flight rules personal flight. The airplane, registered to and operated by the pilot's father, sustained substantial damage. The certificated private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated at Santa Monica Airport, Santa Monica, California, at 1200 hours. The pilot reported in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB Form 6120.1/2, that while flying at 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot executed the emergency procedures and attempted to restart the engine, but without success. The pilot ditched the airplane into the Pacific Ocean and was rescued shortly thereafter. Retrieval personnel reported that the aircraft sank into the ocean to a 20 foot depth. United States Coast Guard personnel were able to retrieve the airplane intact. Mr. Kim Barnette, principal airworthiness inspector, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Van Nuys [California] Flight Standards District Office, conducted the on scene investigation. Inspector Barnette reported that both wings and their respective fuel tanks were not compromised. The right wing fuel tank contained about 15 gallons of an aviation gas and ocean water mixture. The left wing fuel tank was empty. The fuel selector valve handle was positioned to the right wing fuel tank and was about 1/4 inch off the detent. On July 21, 1993, Safety Board investigators examined the aircraft at National Aircraft Salvage, Inc., Long Beach, California, and confirmed that the fuel selector valve handle was positioned to the right fuel tank. The fuel selector valve was removed from its attach point by a National Aircraft Salvage, Inc., mechanic. The mechanic reported that the selector valve handle retaining screw was loose. Examination of the fuel selector valve revealed that it was selected to the left fuel tank. The fuel selector valve shaft displayed extreme wear; the squared shoulders were ground to a rounded shape. The fuel selector valve handle retaining screw was tightened by the mechanic and Safety Board investigators were able to turn the valve handle, with difficulty, in a clockwise direction toward the off position. When the valve handle was in the off position, the fuel selector valve was positioned to the right tank. Continuity of the gear and valve train assembly was established. Finger compression was noted on all cylinders during rotation of the crankshaft. The magnetos were found timed in accordance with the manufacturer's service specifications. Both magnetos, however, did not produce spark when their respective drive shafts were rotated. The magnetos exhibited extensive ocean water corrosion. Examination of the airplane's maintenance logbooks disclosed that an annual inspection was performed on May 1, 1993. The airplane accrued about 16 flight hours since the inspection was performed. Inspector Barnette reported that the fuel selector valve handle must be removed during the inspection to gain access to the airplane's floor boards. Removal of the handle would have exposed the fuel selector shaft.
the inadequate annual inspection by other maintenance personnel and the worn fuel selector valve shaft. Contributing to this accident was the loss of power due to fuel starvation.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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