OMAHA, NE, USA
N10QB
Piper PA-31-325
The airplane received substantial damage during a gear-up landing. The pilot stated that during landing a warning horn sounded which he thought was the stall warning; the pilot continued the landing. Postaccident testing of the landing gear revealed no anomalies.
On August 10, 2000, at 1820 central daylight time, a Piper PA-31-325, N10QB, piloted by a commercial pilot, sustained substantial damage during a gear-up landing at the Millard Airport (MLE), Omaha, Nebraska. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 91 business flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot and three passengers reported no injuries. The flight departed from the Creighton Municipal Airport, Creighton, Nebraska, at 1715 en route to MLE. The pilot reported, "...I did have visual contact with the landing aircraft and judged that it would clear the runway at the time of my landing. At this time I thought I reached down to push the landing gear lever down. I also dropped a checklist from my lap and reached down to retrieve it. Moving my head back up, I thought I saw the red gear-in-transit light go out and the three gear lights illuminate. I did not look at the gear lights again as I immediately heard the traffic from the West announce they had me in sight. I resumed trying to make visual contact with the traffic downwind to ensure they would not turn base in front of me. I also noted I was still slightly fast at about 130 KIAS. I reduced my power to 20 inches, threw in full flaps, because I was slightly high and fast, and went back to my checklist laying on my lap. I double checked that the emergency pumps were on and that we were on the inboard tanks. I noted traffic still on the runway and, while on short final, thought about going around, but then the Cherokee cleared the runway and I deemed it safe to land. As we cleared the fence, the speed was about 90, slightly high, and I brought power all the way back. A warning horn sounded which I deemed to be the stall warning and I proceeded to flare. The warning horn continued and I saw the speed to be about 82 KIAS. I knew that on N932LA, the Navajo Chieftain on which I had most of my Navajo time, the stall warning went off prematurely, and I thought the same case was true here..." Postaccident testing of the landing gear, under the supervision of the Federal Aviation Administration, revealed no anomalies.
the landing gear not deployed, the checklist not followed, the lack of familiarity with the airplane, the landing gear warning system not understood, and the landing gear warning disregarded by the pilot.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
