Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary SEA01LA065

Seattle, WA, USA

Aircraft #1

N30616

Piper J3C-65

Analysis

The pilot reported that he listened to the airport's Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) prior to landing. After landing and turning onto a parallel taxiway, the aircraft ran over a 10-foot-long horizontal barricade, which was "sitting in [the] taxiway" approximately perpendicular to the taxiway centerline. The pilot, who was seated in the rear seat of the tailwheel-equipped aircraft (as required for solo flight for the type) at the time, reported that he was doing "S" turns for taxi visibility, but that the barricade was obstructed from view by the nose of the aircraft. Upon striking the barricade, the aircraft's left main gear collapsed and the left wing dropped, striking another barricade. The pilot stated that the presence and location of the barricade were not announced on ATIS. On-site investigation disclosed that the barricade extended to within two to three feet of the yellow taxiway centerline. Review of a re-recording of ATIS disclosed that ATIS announced closure of several taxiways, but did not indicate that barricades were in place on the parallel taxiway.

Factual Information

On March 17, 2001, approximately 1527 Pacific standard time, a Piper J3C-65, N30616, was substantially damaged when it struck a barricade during taxi from landing at Boeing Field/King County International Airport, Seattle, Washington. The private pilot-in-command, who was the airplane's sole occupant, was not injured in the accident. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the 14 CFR 91 local personal flight. The pilot reported that he listened to the airport's Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) prior to landing. He stated that he subsequently landed, exited runway 13R at taxiway A4, was cleared across runway 13L, and contacted ground control for taxi clearance. The pilot stated that he was cleared to taxi to northeast parking. He stated that he turned north on the taxiway and ran over the 10-foot-long horizontal barricade, which was "sitting in [the] taxiway" approximately perpendicular to the taxiway centerline. The pilot, who was seated in the rear seat of the tailwheel-equipped aircraft (as required for solo flight for the type) at the time, reported that he was doing "S" turns for taxi visibility, but that the barricade was obstructed from view by the nose of the aircraft. Upon striking the barricade, the aircraft's left main gear collapsed and the left wing dropped, striking another barricade. The pilot stated that the presence and location of the barricade were not announced on ATIS and that ground control also did not advise him of the barricade. An on-site investigation by an FAA inspector disclosed that the barricade was located on the taxiway on the northern side of the intersection with closed taxiway A3, extending to within two to three feet of the yellow taxiway centerline. Review of a re-recording of ATIS information SIERRA disclosed that information SIERRA announced that taxiways B2, B4, A3, A5, A6, and A7, and taxiways A2 and A7 between the runways were closed, but did not indicate that barricades were in place on the parallel taxiway. FAA Order 7110.65M, "Air Traffic Control", specifies that the following information be disseminated on ATIS: "Taxiway closures which affect the entrance or exit of active runways, other closures which impact airport operations, [and] other NOTAM's and PIREP's pertinent to operations in the terminal area." FAA Order 7110.65M also specifies inclusion of "Other optional information as local conditions dictate in coordination with ATC", such as "VFR arrival frequencies, temporary airport conditions, LAHSO operations being conducted, or other perishable items that may appear only for a matter of hours or a few days on the ATIS message." FAA Order 7210.3, "Facility Operation and Administration", states that ATIS messages should be kept "as brief and concise as possible", and also specifies that "Optimum duration of up to 30 seconds should not be exceeded unless required for message content completeness." The re-recording of information SIERRA was 48 seconds long. No information was obtained on whether the barricade struck was identified in a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). The pilot also did not indicate whether or not he obtained NOTAMs for Boeing Field prior to the accident flight.

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's failure to visually detect the barricade, resulting in a collision with the barricade. Factors included the barricade, and inadequate information on the ATIS broadcast.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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