Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary NYC02LA019

New Windsor, MD, USA

Aircraft #1

N996T

Norton/Cloeren Titan Tornado II

Analysis

The airplane departed on a local VFR flight, and while flying in a rural area crashed. The airplane came to rest in a small creek. The tailboom and wing had completely separated from the main cabin, except for some of the flight-control cables. Flight control continuity was verified from the left aileron to the right aileron, and from the left flap to the right flap. Flight control continuity could not be verified from the wing or empennage to the cockpit because of impact damage. The fuel tank came to rest upside down in the creek with the filling cap off. The smell of fuel was present on scene. The three-bladed-pusher propeller was attached to the engine and intact. One of the propeller blades had mud on it. In addition, no chordwise scratches, "S" bends, or Leading edge gouges were observed on any of the propeller blades. No preimpact failures or malfunctions were identified during the examination of the wreckage.

Factual Information

On October 30, 2001, at 1637 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Titan Tornado II, N996T, was destroyed when it impacted terrain near New Windsor, Maryland. The certificated commercial pilot and certificated private pilot were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local personal flight that departed Clearview Airpark (2W2), Westminster, Maryland. No flight plan was filed, and the flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. While driving a car, a witness observed the airplane pitch up as if in a climb, and then "dipped" towards the ground out of view. The witness did not see the accident, nor was she aware of it at the time of her observation, learning later from the local news what happened. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, some freshly broken tree branches marked the start of the debris path. About 40 feet past the branches were two ground scars. One scar was approximately 9 inches square. The other was approximately 2 feet wide and continued all the way to the main wreckage. The airplane came to rest in a small creek. The tailboom and wing had completely separated from the main cabin, except for some of the flight-control cables. Flight control continuity was verified from the left aileron to the right aileron, and from the left flap to the right flap. Flight control continuity could not be verified from the wing or empennage to the cockpit because of impact damage. The fuel tank came to rest upside down in the creek with the filler cap off. The inspector could not verify if there was any fuel in the tank, but noticed a fuel smell while on scene. The airplane was equipped with a Rotax model 912, and a three-bladed-pusher propeller. The propeller was intact and attached to the engine. One of the propeller blades had mud on it. In addition, no chordwise scratches, "S" bends, or Leading edge gouges were observed on any of the propeller blades. The inspector's examination of the wreckage revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. In addition, the airplane logbooks were not identified at the accident site, and follow on attempts to locate them were unsuccessful. An autopsy was performed on the pilot at the Medical Examiners Office in Baltimore, Maryland, on October 31, 2001. The FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed a toxicological test on samples taken from the pilot on December 6, 2001. The first pilot, who was located in the front seat of the airplane, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine-land rating. His last FAA third-class medical certificate was dated August 20, 2001. On the medical application, he reported 800 hours of total flight experience. According to excepts taken from the pilot's logbook, he had approximately 761 hours of total flight experience, including 22.2 hours in the accident airplane. His last flight in the accident airplane, prior to the accident, was on November 27, 1999. In addition, he completed a flight review in a Cessna 172 on October 28, 2001. The second pilot, who was located in the rear seat of the airplane, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine-land, multi-engine land, glider, and instrument airplane. In addition, he held a airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate. His last FAA third-class medical certificate was also dated August 20, 2001. On the medical application, he reported 1,900 hours of total flight experience. In addition, the pilot's logbook was not identified at the accident, and follow on attempts to locate it failed. The operator manual for the engine stated, "Danger! This engine, by its design, is subject to sudden stoppage! Engine stoppage can result in crash landings. Such crash landings can lead to serious bodily injury or death. Never fly the aircraft equipped with this engine at locations, airspeeds, altitudes, or other circumstances from which a successful no-power landing cannot be made, after sudden engine stoppage." The manual further stated, "Warning! This is not a certificated aircraft engine. It has not received any safety or durability testing, and conforms to no aircraft standards. It is for use in experimental, uncertificated aircraft and vehicles only in which an engine failure will not compromise safety. User assumes all risk of use, and acknowledges by his use that he knows this engine is subject to sudden stoppage." According to FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-27D, Certification and Operation of Amateur-Built Aircraft, "the amateur-built program was designed to permit person(s) to build an aircraft solely for educational or recreational purposes. The FAA has always permitted amateur builders freedom to select their own designs. The FAA does not formally approve these designs since it is not practicable to develop design standards for the multitude of unique design configurations generated by kit manufacturers and amateur builders." It also stated, "Since 1983, FAA inspections of amateur-built aircraft have been limited to ensuring the use of acceptable workmanship methods, techniques, practices, and issuing operating limitations necessary to protect persons and property not involved in this activity."

Probable Cause and Findings

Loss of power for an undetermined reason.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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