Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary CHI07FA084

Munster, IN, USA

Aircraft #1

N332HA

Beech 58

Analysis

The twin-engine airplane was destroyed and the two pilots fatally injured following a loss of control during an approach to land. Witnesses reported that the airplane struck the ground in a nose low, left wing low attitude. Some of the witnesses also reported that one of the airplane's engines was "sputtering." Interviews of family members of the two pilots indicated that the flight was for the purpose of instrument flight instruction. Examination of the airplane subsequent to the accident revealed that the airplane was equipped with a throw-over control yoke and that it was positioned in the left pilot position. The left engine fuel lines forward of the firewall contained no fuel. Both fuel selector handles and valves were found in the off position; however, the fuel selector panel had been displaced from the floor and determination of the in-flight position could not be made. Radar data for the accident flight showed that the airplane had flown a non-precision instrument approach to the airport. Communications with the flightcrew of another airplane showed that the accident airplane was in visual contact with other traffic and that the accident flightcrew planned to enter the airport traffic pattern. Radar data further showed that after starting a descent, the airplane continued to decelerate and its altitude continued to decrease until the end of the data. Examination of the data showed that the final calibrated airspeed of the airplane was about 87 knots. The airplane flight manual listed a landing approach speed of 96 knots, a minimum controllable airspeed of 81 knots and aircraft performance data showed an expected stall speed in a range between 69 knots and 113 knots, depending on the angle of bank and flap configuration.

Factual Information

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 9, 2007, about 1920 central standard time, a Beech 58, N332HA, piloted by a commercial pilot, was destroyed upon impact with the ground during an approach for landing near Munster, Indiana. A flight instructor was also on-board and seated in the right seat. The Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight was operating in visual meteorological conditions and was not on a flight plan. The pilot and instructor both sustained fatal injuries. The local flight originated at Lansing Municipal Airport (IGQ), Lansing, Illinois about 1745.A study of radar data obtained from the FAA revealed two separate tracks that could be associated with the accident airplane. The first track originated from IGQ and proceeded toward the Greater Kankakee Airport (IKK), Kankakee, Illinois, about 32 nautical miles south-southwest of IGQ. The recorded time of the initial radar return for this track coincided with the approximate time of departure of the accident airplane. The second track originated near IKK and proceeded toward IGQ. The recorded time of the final radar return for this track coincided with the reported time of the accident. In addition, the final radar return for this track related to a position about 0.25 nautical miles from the accident site. The ground track of the airplane for the flight from IKK to IGQ began with the airplane at 2,900 feet pressure altitude and a ground track of 278 degrees. The ground track showed the airplane approximately aligned with the departure end of runway 22 at IKK. The track showed that the airplane then made a climbing right turn to about 025 degrees to an altitude of 4,500 feet. At this point, the airplane was on a direct course to the Peotone (EON) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Radio Range Tactical Air Navigation Aid (VORTAC). After passing the EON VORTAC, the airplane's ground track continued on a 025 degree direction for about 4 minutes before executing a turn to approximately 050 degrees. At this point the airplane was approximately aligned with the inbound course for the "VOR or GPS-A" instrument approach procedure for IGQ. The published inbound course for this approach is 044 degrees. About when the airplane began this turn, it also began a descent in altitude. The descent continued until the end of the recorded data. During the descent, the airplane's calibrated airspeed decreased from approximately 150 knots to 87 knots, and the altitude went from about 4,500 feet to 900 feet pressure altitude. During the last 36 seconds of the recorded data, the airplane turned to the right from 055 degrees to 115 degrees, the altitude decreased from 1,100 feet to 900 feet, and the calibrated airspeed decreased from 119 knots to 87 knots. The accident site was located about 0.25 miles and 070 degrees from the final recorded radar data point. Numerous ground witnesses were interviewed. Several witnesses near the accident site reported seeing the airplane on an easterly heading at a low altitude before it turned left toward the north and impacted the ground in a nose low, left wing low attitude. Some witnesses also reported hearing one of the airplane's engines "sputtering" before it impacted the ground. According to a family member of the left seat pilot, he had informed this family member that he would be flying with a co-worker on the evening of the accident. He stated that his co-worker was going to show him how to fly the airplane in inclement weather. A family member of the right seat pilot stated that he believed the right seat pilot flew the airplane during the accident flight at the request of either his co-worker (left seat pilot), or at the request of his employer. The family member did not believe that the right seat pilot would have volunteered due to the driving distance from his home to IGQ. Both pilots were employed by an air taxi operator located at IGQ. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The left seat pilot was 26 years old and held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate with an airplane single-engine rating. The left seat pilot's most recent first class medical certificate was issued on August 14, 2006, and listed no restrictions. According to the left seat pilot's flight logbook, he had accumulated 492.1 hours of flight experience as of the last entry dated March 5, 2007. The logbook showed that the flight experience included 54.9 hours in multiengine airplanes and 28.1 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The last flight entry indicated that three instrument approaches were flown in the accident airplane and that the flight was conducted with a safety pilot. The safety pilot listed in the logbook was also an employee of the air taxi operator that employed the two accident pilots. The right seat pilot was 26 years old and held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and airplane multiengine land ratings. The single-engine rating was limited to commercial pilot privileges. The certificate also listed a type rating for Lear Jet airplanes. The pilot also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine, and instrument airplane ratings. The right seat pilot's most recent first class medical certificate was issued on October 31, 2006, and listed no restrictions. According to the right seat pilot's flight logbook, he had accumulated 3,940.4 hours of flight experience as of the last entry dated March 8, 2007. The logbook showed that the flight experience included 1,657.6 hours in multiengine airplanes and 1,825.1 hours of flight instruction given. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was a 1975 Beech model 58 Baron, serial number TH-683. The airplane was a twin-engine monoplane of predominately aluminum construction. It was equipped to carry six occupants including the pilot and had retractable tri-cycle landing gear. According to the aircraft maintenance records, the most recent annual inspection was performed on January 11, 2007, and the airplane had accumulated 5,729.0 hours as of that date. The left engine was a Teledyne Continental Motors model IO-520-C, serial number 816875-R. This engine was rated to produce 285 Horsepower. Maintenance records showed that as of the annual inspection, the engine had accumulated 143.6 hours since its most recent overhaul. The overhaul was completed on December 27, 2005, and the engine was installed on the accident airplane on February 6, 2006. The right engine was a Teledyne Continental Motors model IO-520-CB, serial number 298759-R. This engine was also rated to produce 285 Horsepower. Maintenance records showed that as of the annual inspection, the engine had accumulated 673.0 hours since its most recent overhaul. The overhaul was completed on October 15, 2001, and the engine was installed on the accident airplane on November 12, 2001. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1845, the recorded weather at IGQ was: winds from 210 degrees at 5 knots; temperature 9 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.90 inches of Mercury (Hg). All other data fields were recorded as missing. The 1945 recorded data for IGQ was missing data for all fields. The Gary/Chicago International Airport (GYY), located about 7 miles northeast of the accident site, recorded the weather conditions at 1854 as: wind from 140 degrees at 12 knots; visibility 7 miles; sky condition, scattered clouds at 6,500 feet, broken clouds at 9,000 feet, overcast clouds at 11,000 feet; temperature 13 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.88 inches of Hg. At 1950, the GYY weather was: wind from 230 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 7 miles with light rain; sky condition, scattered clouds at 2,200 feet, broken clouds at 3,500 feet, overcast clouds at 4,300 feet; temperature 12 degrees C; dew point 9 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.92 inches of Hg. The Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), located about 18 miles northwest of the accident site, recorded the weather conditions at 1912 as: wind from 160 degrees at 8 knots; visibility 3 miles with light blowing rain; sky condition, few clouds at 3,600 feet, scattered clouds at 4,300 feet, overcast clouds at 5,500 feet; temperature 9 degrees C; dew Point 8 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.88 inches of Hg. At 1949, the MDW weather was: wind from 170 degrees at 9 knots; visibility 2-1/2 miles with light blowing rain; sky condition, few clouds at 2,800 feet, broken clouds at 4,700 feet, overcast clouds at 6,500 feet; temperature 9 degrees C; dew point 8 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.87 inches of Hg. IKK, located about 31 miles southwest of the accident site, recorded the weather conditions at 1844 as: wind from 210 degrees at 4 knots; visibility 1-1/2 miles with drizzle; sky condition, overcast clouds at 6,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.92 inches of Hg. At 1949, the IKK weather was: wind from 220 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 1 mile with light rain; sky condition, broken clouds at 2,600 feet, overcast clouds at 3,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 7 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.92 inches of Hg. AIDS TO NAVIGATION The IGQ airport is located 050 degrees and 2.4 nautical miles from the Chicago Heights (CGT) VORTAC, and 34 degrees and19.8 nautical miles (nm) from the EON VORTAC. The CGT VORTAC is used as one possible primary navigation source for the IGQ "VOR or GPS-A" instrument approach procedure. EON can be used as an initial approach fix for that same approach procedure. This procedure was used to allow pilots approaching IGQ to transition from instrument flight rules meteorological conditions to visual conditions in order to land at IGQ. At the time of the accident, four other instrument approach procedures were published for IGQ. COMMUNICATIONS A pilot that was in an aircraft that was approaching to land at IGQ at the time of the accident reported that when he announced his position on the common traffic advisory frequency, the accident airplane responded, "we'll be entering a midfield crosswind for runway 18, we have the Citation in site, we'll let you guys go first, we're number two." No other communications from the accident airplane are known. AIRPORT INFORMATION IGQ was equipped with two runways. Runway 18/36 was 4,002 feet by 75 feet and runway 09/27 was 3,395 feet by 75 feet. Both runways were constructed of asphalt. Five instrument approach procedures were approved for IGQ at the time of the accident. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION The airplane came to rest in the southbound lanes of a four-lane lane road about one mile east of IGQ. External Airframe Examination: The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the aft fuselage. The right outboard leading edge of the stabilizer was displaced upward. The elevator remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer and all hinge locations were intact. The right hand elevator balance horn/weight was partially separated from the elevator and was displaced in an upward direction. The elevator trim tabs were deflected downward about 1-1/2 inches when measured at the trailing edge relative to the elevator. The vertical stabilizer remained attached to the aft fuselage and no damage was evident. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and all hinge locations were intact. The rudder had no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab was deflected about 1/4" to the left when measured at the trailing edge relative to the rudder. The aft fuselage from the tail to the aft end of the cabin section was intact. The cabin section was displaced to the right relative to the aft fuselage. The roof section of the cabin was predominately separated from the lower section of the fuselage. The forward fuselage was displaced to the left relative to the cabin section and was crushed rearward to the instrument panel location. The left wing was intact and exhibited twisting along its full length toward a higher angle of incidence at the tip. The left aileron and flap remained attached to the wing and all of the hinge locations were intact. The aileron trim tab was intact and was deflected about 1/4" down when measured at the trailing edge relative to the aileron. The left engine remained attached to the left wing. The firewall was crushed aft. The right wing spar was separated about two feet from the fuselage side. Outboard of this location, the wing was crushed and fragmented. The right aileron and flap remained attached to the remains of the right wing and all hinge locations were intact. The right fuel tank was ruptured. The right engine and firewall had separated from the wing. Cabin Examination: The front seats of the airplane had separated from the airframe. The right seat lap belt was intact and had been unbuckled during recovery of the occupants. The left seat lap belt remained buckled and the fabric belt was cut during recovery of the occupants. The shoulder harnesses were found retracted in the ceiling of the cabin. The ends of the harness consisted of a fabric loop. No metal attachment fitting was found. The landing gear selector was found in the down position. The landing gear actuation mechanism was found in the down position. The flap selector and indicator were found in the "approach" position. Measurements of the flap actuator corresponded to 17 degrees of flap deflection. The elevator trim indicator showed 9 units of up elevator trim. Measurements of the elevator trim actuator corresponded to 12 degrees of downward tab deflection. The rudder trim actuator measurement corresponded to a neutral trim setting. Both magneto switches were found in the "both" position. The recording hour-meter read 2,348.8 hours at the time of the examination. The altimeter was set for a barometric pressure setting of 29.92 inches of mercury. The altimeter read 5,880 feet at the accident scene. The vertical speed indicator showed a positive indication of 350 feet per minute. The left and right tachometer needles were found at 2,050 and 700 RPM respectively. Both remote fuel selector handles were found in the off position. The remote selector housing had separated from the cabin floor. The selector handles operated valves within the wing using push-pull cables. The fuel selector handle positions were compared to the position of the actual valves within the wings and were found to be agreement. The fuel selector valve handles were operated and no anomalies were noted. The in-flight position of the handles could not be positively determined. Left engine examination: The left engine remained attached to the airframe. The propeller flange had separated from the crankshaft during the accident. The fuel pump was removed and the drive coupling was intact. A small quantity of fuel was found in the distribution manifold. No fuel was found within any of the fuel lines forward of the firewall. The magnetos were found to produce spark at all spark plug leads when rotated by hand. The impulse couplings could be heard while rotating the magnetos. The vacuum pump coupling was intact and the vacuum pump could be rotated by hand. The upper spark plugs were examined with no anomalies noted. The crankshaft could be rotated approximately 270 degrees. Piston movement was observed on all cylinders. Compression was confirmed on cylinders number 1, 4, and 6. Valve action was noted on all cylinders with the exception of cylinder number 5. Cylinder number 5 had damage to the cooling fins and to the rocker arm area of the head. The intake valve rocker arm was separated from the number 5 cylinder head. The exhaust rocker arm was displaced. Accessory drive continuity was confirmed during rotation of the crankshaft. The propeller governor arm was found at the low pitch stop. Right engine examination: The right engine and firewall had separated from the airframe. The propeller hub and two propeller blades remained attached to the crankshaft. The fuel pump was removed and the drive coupling was intact. A small quantity of fuel was found in the distribution manifold. Fuel was found within the fuel lines forward of the firewall. The magnetos were found to produce s

Probable Cause and Findings

The fuel starvation for an undetermined reason which led to the loss of power on the left engine. Additional causes were the pilot's failure to maintain airspeed which led to his loss of control of the airplane. Factors in the accident were the flight instructor's inability to take remedial action because the airplane was not equipped with a full set of dual flight controls.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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