Teterboro, NJ, USA
N145AP
Learjet 45
N336FX
Cessna CL60
On August 13, 2007 at about 1705 Eastern daylight time, there was a runway incursion at Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New Jersey involving a N145AP, a LJ45 and N336FX, a CL60. There was a developmental training on local control at the time of the incident. The controller cleared N145AP to land on runway 6 and N336FX was instructed to taxi into position and hold on runway 1. The controller then cleared N336FX for takeoff prior to the arrival passing though the intersection of runways 6 and 1. Between issuing a the landing clearance for runway 6 and the takeoff clearance for runway 1, local control was issuing instructions to VFR helicopters conducting traffic watch over the Lincoln Tunnel and clearance to another IFR arrival checking in on the approach, a helicopter landing and departures. The FAA reported that the airplanes missed colliding by 600 feet vertically and 2000 feet laterally. The trainer was instructing the developmental on helicopter operations.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On August 13, 2007, at 1705 Eastern daylight time, N145AP, a LJ45, and N336FX, a CL60, came within 600 feet vertically and 2000 feet laterally at the intersection of runways 1 and 6 at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The tower local controller had cleared N145AP to land on runway 6. Two minutes and 31 seconds later, the tower local controller cleared N336FX for takeoff from runway 1. N336FX had been directed to taxi into position and hold 30 seconds prior to his takeoff clearance being issued. FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control" require that an arriving aircraft be separated from another aircraft using an intersecting runway by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold or flight path of the other aircraft until the preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection/flight path or a preceding arriving aircraft is clear of the landing runway, completed landing roll and will hold short of the intersection/flight path, or has passed the intersection/flight path. In this incident, the local controller did not ensure that N145AP had crossed the intersection of runway 1 and 6 prior to N336FX departing runway 1. N145AP was operating as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 flight on an IFR flight plan with a crew of 2 and 5 passengers. N336FX was operating as a 14 CFR Part 135 flight on an IFR flight plan with a crew of 2 and 4 passengers. There were no injuries to any of the occupants. N145AP departed Memphis International Airport (MEM) and was conducting the ILS runway 6 approach to TEB. At 1702:29, on initial contact with the TEB local controller, the pilot said, "ILS inbound [runway] six." The tower local controller acknowledged with a landing clearance. N336FX was departing TEB for Shannon Airport, Ireland (EINN). At 1704:30, the local controller transmitted to N336FX, "runway one position and hold, landing traffic runway six." N336FX acknowledged the position and hold instructions. At 1705:01, the local controller cleared N336FX for takeoff while N145AP was on final approach. N336FX departed and passed through the intersection of runway 1 and 6 as N145AP was approximately 2000 feet from the approach end of runway 1, on the landing roll. The tower local controller did not issue a warning or advisory to either aircraft. According to the local controller, the controller was "extremely busy" with numerous aircraft that required a variety of services. The qualified local controller was busy training the developmental and "trying to keep up with the traffic". After clearing N145AP to land, and putting N366FX into position and hold, the controller became distracted and did not visually confirm N145AP had passed the intersection prior to the developmental controller clearing N336FX for takeoff. According to pilot statements, at or near the landing threshold of runway 6, the pilots of N145AP noticed a turbine powered aircraft departing from runway 1. The pilots of N336FX were not aware an incident had occurred until advised several days after the event. PERSONNEL INFORMATION Certification and flight experience for the flight crews was not requested. The local controller on duty at the time of the incident entered duty with the FAA in 2002 and had been at TEB tower since July 2003. The developmental local controller entered on duty with the FAA in 2003 and had been at TEB since November 2004. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION The TEB weather observation at 1651 was: wind 290 at 9 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 6,500 feet, temperature 29, dew point 16, altimeter 29.79 inches. The TEB weather at 1751 was: wind 310 at 8, gust 18, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 6,000 feet, temperature 29, dew point 15, altimeter 29.78 inches. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION There was no damage was reported to either aircraft. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Air Traffic Control Information TEB Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) was an ATC-7 level facility responsible for aircraft operations on the airport surface and in the Class D airspace in the immediate vicinity of the airport. The TEB Class D airspace underlies Newark Liberty International Airport's Class B airspace. The control tower was constructed on the east side of the airport by the FAA and went into operation on October 29, 1975. The tower did not have a ground radar system such as the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS). ATCT staffing at the time of the incident included a tower supervisor, a traffic management coordinator, a qualified local controller and local control developmental, a qualified ground controller and ground controller developmental, and a flight data and clearance delivery operator combined to a single controller position. The qualified local controller and qualified ground controller were conducting on the job training. Airport Information Teterboro Airport serves general aviation aircraft. The annual air activity averages 200,000 operations per year. The airport is configured with two intersecting runways, runway 1/19 which was 7000 feet by 150 feet and 6/24 which was 6013 feet by 150 feet. The two runways intersect 5700 feet from the approach end of runway 1 and 4113 feet from the approach end of runway 6.
A runway incursion ocurred when the local controller did not ensure that N145AP has passed the intersection of runways 1 and 6 prior to authorizing N336FX to depart runway 1.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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