Brigham City, UT, USA
N202HW
Haring Clay RV8A
When the pilot was about fifty miles from the destination airport, with the fuel gauge indicating about 20 gallons of fuel remaining, the experimental airplane's engine lost all power. The pilot ultimately made a power-off forced landing in open terrain, and the airplane nosed over when its nose gear dug into the soft terrain. The investigation determined that there was no evidence of any fuel in the airplane's fuel system, and no evidence of fuel spillage or leakage at the scene. There also was no evidence of stains on the airplane consistent with in-flight fuel system leakage. A post-accident inspection of the airplane and its fuel system found no anomalies or evidence of leakage. The pilot, who had planned his flight using the "recommended power settings for cruise flight" of eight to nine gallons per hour, did not take into account the fuel burn for his initial climb of over 11,000 feet. In addition to that climb, the pilot had to climb back to 11,500 feet mean sea level (msl) after twice descending to lower altitudes in order to maintain visual meteorological conditions (once to 9,500 feet msl, and once to 7,500 feet msl). In the section of the NTSB form 6120.1/2 where the operator/owner was provided the opportunity to indicate how this accident could have been prevented, the pilot stated, "Installation of Fuel Burn Rate instrumentation."
On October 10, 2007, about 1515 mountain daylight time, an experimental Haring Clay RV8A airplane, N202HW, nosed over during a forced landing approximately 15 miles west of Brigham City, Utah. The airline transport pilot and his passenger received minor injuries, and the airplane, which was owned and operated by the pilot, sustained substantial damage. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal pleasure flight, which was en route to Ogden, Utah, departed Newberg, Oregon, about three hours and fifteen minutes prior to the accident. The flight was being conducted in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan had been filed. According to the pilot, when he was about fifty miles from the destination airport, with the fuel gauge indicating about 20 gallons of fuel remaining, he initiated a descent, and shortly thereafter the airplane's engine lost all power. Because he was unable to the get the engine to restart, the pilot made a power-off forced landing in open terrain. During the landing roll, the airplane's nose wheel dug into the soft terrain, and it nosed over onto its back. When the airplane nosed over, the canopy shattered, and because of the soft terrain, the protective roll-bar sunk into the ground, creating a situation where both the pilot and his passenger were unable to exit the airplane until rescuers arrived on the scene about one hour after the accident. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that responded to the scene, there was no evidence of any fuel in the airplane's fuel system. According to that inspector, there was no spillage or leakage at the scene, and no evidence of any stains on the airplane consistent with in-flight fuel system leakage. During a post-accident phone interview with the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge (IIC), the pilot stated that he had not seen any fuel leaking from the airplane at the scene during the time he was trapped in the airplane, nor after he had been rescued. He also stated that he did not detect any evidence of fuel having leaked into the ground at the scene. As part of the investigation, the FAA asked maintenance personnel from the Fixed Base Operator (FBO) that recovered the airplane to perform an inspection of the airplane's fuel system. According to the FAA, the FBO mechanic reported that they were able to recover less than two fluid ounces of fuel from the airplane’s system, and that they could find no evidence of a leak anywhere in the fuel system. The FBO mechanic further reported that there were no fuel stains or any other evidence of either on-ground or in-flight fuel leakage anywhere on the airplane (except for one "very minor" fuel stain around the edge of one rivet on the wing root upper skin). It was also determined that both fuel tank caps were tight, with good seals, without vents, and with no staining around their edges. The engine fuel sump/gasculator was also inspected, and no evidence of anomaly or leakage was found. In his written report to the NTSB, the pilot stated that his flight-planned fuel flow for the flight was eight to nine gallons per hour at the "recommended power settings for cruise flight." He also stated that he took off with about 40 gallons of usable fuel on board, and that although he had planned for the flight to take 3.8 hours, the engine quit 3.4 hours after takeoff. Post-accident calculations by the IIC determined that if the fuel burn for the entire flight was calculated at a constant eight gallons per hour, at 3.4 hours there would have been approximately 13 gallons remaining. If the fuel burn had been calculated at nine gallons per hour, there would have been about 9.4 gallons remaining at 3.4 hours. What the aforementioned calculations do not take into account is the fuel consumed during start, taxi, takeoff, and the initial climb from 190 feet mean sea level (msl) at Newberg, Oregon, to the initial cruise altitude of 11,500 feet msl. These calculations also do not take into account the fact that the pilot twice climbed back to 11,500 feet msl after descending to lower altitudes in order to maintain visual meteorological conditions (once to 9,500 feet msl, and once to 7,500 feet msl). Although there were no climb performance charts for this experimental aircraft, the investigation determined that according to the associated owner's handbook, a similar engine of the same rated horsepower (Lycoming O-360, in a Piper PA-24), which burned between 7.5 and 8.8 gallons per hour at normal cruise settings, would consume between 14 to 16 gallons per hour during a full-throttle climb to 11,500 feet msl. In the section of the NTSB form 6120.1/2 where the operator/owner was provided the opportunity to indicate how this accident could have been prevented, the pilot stated, "Installation of Fuel Burn Rate instrumentation."
Fuel exhaustion due to the pilot's inaccurate fuel consumption calculations. Factors include an inaccurate fuel quantity measuring system, and soft terrain encountered during the landing roll.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
