Lubbock, TX, USA
N917GT
AERO COMMANDER 500 - B
The pilot reported that, as the airplane approached the landing airport, he descended through windshear and turbulence before he turned on final; a strong southwest wind caused him to overshoot the final approach segment. The airplane was a "little high and fast," and he was encountering windshear bumps. He reduced engine power and maneuvered back to the runway centerline. He slowed the airplane to landing speed while applying half and then full flaps. The airplane subsequently touched down with the landing gear partially extended. The pilot did not recall seeing the landing gear position lights illuminated green; he further stated that he recited, but did not perform, the landing gear check because he was "very focused" on controlling the airplane through the windshear. He thought he landed the airplane with the gear up, and, at some point during the slide, he instinctively activated the gear handle. He said that he thought that he did not extend the landing gear. Postaccident examination of the landing gear system revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
On October 30, 2013, at 2140 central daylight time, an Aero Commander 500-B, N917GT, impacted the runway during a gear-up landing at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport (LBB), Lubbock, Texas. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage. The commercial pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Central Airlines Inc., and operated by Central Air Southwest under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 as an on-demand cargo flight that was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that departed from El Paso International Airport (ELP), El Paso, Texas, at 2000 mountain daylight time and was destined to LBB. The pilot stated that he departed ELP using runway 8R to "escape" from underneath a thunderstorm that had approached from the west. He climbed the airplane east in a "clear corridor," with lightning to the north and south, to a cruise altitude of 9,000 feet mean sea level. At Carlsbad VHF Omni Directional Radio Range VOR, he requested direct LBB to avoid storms along the planned route over Hobbs VOR. He stated that there was moderate turbulence the entire route of flight. The airplane ground speed was 216 knots with a tailwind of 50 knots. He said that he approached LBB from the southwest where the surface winds were 260 degrees at 11 knots. The descent to LBB was "very bumpy." He planned to land on runway 35L because there were cells east and just west of LBB but changed his planned runway to 17R because of his greater familiarity with it. He again changed the planned runway to runway 35L because the turbulence increased as the western cell approached. He flew a left base for runway 35L and descended through "some" wind shear and turbulence before he turned on final. He said that a strong southwest wind caused him to overshoot the final approach segment. The airplane was a "little high and fast," and he was still dealing with wind shear bumps. He reduced engine power and maneuvered back to the runway center line. He performed a GUMPS check (gas, undercarriage, mixture, propellers), and descended the airplane to intercept the visual approach slope indicator glide path. He slowed the airplane to landing speed while applying half, then full flaps. During the last 100 feet of the descent to the runway, he was thinking that it would be a "nice landing." He then heard the sound of metal scraping runway. The airplane slid to the left of the runway centerline and stopped at intersection Juliet. The pilot stated the he did not recall seeing the landing gear position lights illuminated green. He said that he recited, but did not perform the GUMPS check, because he was "very focused" on controlling the airplane through the wind shear. He thought he landed the airplane gear-up, and at some point during the slide instinctively activated gear handle. He said that it was hard for him to believe, but he thinks, he left the landing gear up. Photos provided by the Federal Aviation Administration show the airplane on the runway with the left main landing gear extended and parallel to the vertical axis of the airplane, the right main landing gear extended and in the aft direction and parallel to the longitudinal axis of the airplane, and the nose landing gear retracted. According to the operator's maintenance personnel, during normal retraction of the landing gear, the right main landing gear will first begin retraction followed by the left main landing gear and then the nose landing gear. During gear extension, the nose landing gear will extend first, followed by the right main landing gear, and then the left main landing gear. If there was significant weight on one of the landing gear, then the sequence of extension/retraction could change. According to maintenance personnel from a fixed base operated at LBB that recovered the airplane, the landing gear selector handle was in the down position, and the left main landing gear was down and locked. When the airplane was raised and placed on jacks, the right main landing gear extended and locked into the down position. They then placed weight on the empennage, and pulled the nose landing gear down and it locked into position. The operator's maintenance personnel replaced one propeller and one engine and flew the airplane back to the operator's base in Kansas City, Missouri, under a ferry permit with no maintenance performed on the landing gear system. The operator's maintenance personnel stated that the airplane was flown back to the base with the landing gear extended. The operator's maintenance personnel retracted the landing gear after the airplane arrived at the base and the landing gear was reported to function normally. At the time the pilot was hired by the operator, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate a total flight time of about 1,177 hours, of which 15 hours were in multiengine airplanes and 113 hours were in complex airplanes. It was his first employment as a commercial air carrier pilot. On July 25, 2013, the pilot passed airman competency/proficiency checks under Parts 135.293, 135.297, and 135.299 that was provided by a company check airman. At the time of the accident, the pilot had a total flight time of 1,521 hours, of which 285 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane. Weather radar mosaics and weather reports for LBB are included in the docket of this report.
The pilot's failure to complete a landing checklist and extend the landing gear, which resulted in a gear-up landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's diverted attention to the weather during approach.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
Aviation Accidents App
In-Depth Access to Aviation Accident Reports
