Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary ERA14FA073

Atlanta, GA, USA

Aircraft #1

N50PM

RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY 390

Analysis

The pilot and passenger departed on a night personal flight. A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that, immediately after departure, the passenger asked the pilot if he had turned on the heat. The pilot subsequently informed the tower air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport. The controller then cleared the airplane to land and asked the pilot if he needed assistance. The pilot replied "negative" and did not declare an emergency. The pilot acknowledged to the passenger that it was hot in the cabin. The CVR recorded the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) issue 11 warnings, including obstacle, terrain, and stall warnings; these warnings occurred while the airplane was on the downwind leg for the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain and was consumed by postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. During the attempted return to the airport, possibly to resolve a cabin heat problem, the pilot was operating in a high workload environment due to, in part, his maneuvering visually at low altitude in the traffic pattern at night, acquiring inbound traffic, and being distracted by the reported high cabin temperature and multiple EGPWS alerts. The passenger was seated in the right front seat and in the immediate vicinity of the flight controls, but no evidence was found indicating that she was operating the flight controls during the flight. Although the pilot had a history of coronary artery disease, the autopsy found no evidence of a recent cardiac event, and an analysis of the CVR data revealed that the pilot was awake, speaking, and not complaining of chest pain or shortness of breath; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot's cardiac condition contributed to the accident. Toxicological testing detected several prescription medications in the pilot's blood, lung, and liver, including one to treat his heart disease; however, it is unlikely that any of these medications resulted in impairment. Although the testing revealed that the pilot had used marijuana at some time before the accident, insufficient evidence existed to determine whether the pilot was impaired by its use at the time of the accident. Toxicology testing also detected methylone in the pilot's blood. Methylone is a stimulant similar to cocaine and Ecstasy, and its effects can include relaxation, euphoria, and excited calm, and it can cause acute changes in cognitive performance and impair information processing. Given the level of methylone (0.34 ug/ml) detected in the pilot's blood, it is likely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident. The pilot's drug impairment likely contributed to his failure to maintain control of the airplane.

Factual Information

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn December 17, 2013 at 1924 eastern standard time (EST), a Raytheon Aircraft Company 390, N50PM, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain, and was consumed by an explosion and post-crash fire while returning to land at Fulton County Airport – Brown Field (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia. The airplane departed at 1920. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight to New Orleans Lake Front Airport (NEW), New Orleans, Louisiana. The private pilot and sole passenger were fatally injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to statements from the fixed base operator (FBO) personnel where the airplane was parked, the aircraft was towed from a nearby maintenance facility and parked on their ramp about 1720. At 1738, the pilot called to request 250 gallons of fuel with Prist and the aircraft was fueled about 1755. The pilot and passenger arrived at the FBO about 1900 and parked their vehicle next to the airplane. After the luggage was placed in the airplane, the pilot informed FBO personnel that a marshaler was not necessary, which personnel reported as "not unusual for him." Security camera video captured the airplane parked on the ramp and the pilot and passenger arriving in a personal vehicle. The video footage revealed only the front portion of the airplane, but showed the pilot conversing with ramp personnel for a few moments, then walking out of the video frame towards the left wing tip. A few moments later, the video showed the pilot walking around the right wing towards the front of the airplane, turning around and reversing his route coming back into the video frame near the front of the left wing near the cabin door. The cabin door was closed and the video captured movement through the left side cockpit windows. A few minutes later, the airplane's strobe lights were illuminated. Several moments later, the airplane's taxi lights were illuminated and the airplane was recorded taxiing from the parking ramp. Due to lamp light reflection off the side windows, it could not be conclusively determined who was seated in the pilot seat or co-pilot seat; however, the silhouette that was observed appeared to be that of an individual wearing a ball cap. The pilot was observed wearing a ball cap as he entered the airplane prior to closing the door; no ball cap was observed being worn by the passenger. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording, the pilot contacted the FTY Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) ground controller at 1902:12 and requested the IFR clearance. At 1903:12 the clearance was read back by the pilot and taxi clearance was requested and granted. During the taxi out, various personal conversations were recorded between the pilot and passenger as well as the pilot missing a turn during the taxi and the ground controller providing him a modified taxi clearance. At 1908:54, the pilot requested "a couple of minutes here at the end…" From 1909:10 to 1916:07, various test tones were recorded including several "lift dump fail" test tones. During that time, the pilot also asked the passenger if she had his phone. A photograph was found in the pilot's phone of the warning light configuration. Meta data revealed that the photograph was recorded at 1906 on the date of the accident; however, it could not be conclusively determined if the noted time was accurate. At 1916:36, the pilot requested takeoff clearance. At 1919:19, takeoff clearance was issued by the ATCT controller and acknowledged by the pilot. At 1920:15, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two engine igniters which continued until the end of the recording. At 1920:47, the passenger asked "did you put heat on?" to which the pilot replied "why is that?" At 1920:55, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warned "to low terrain to low terrain." At 1921:02, the pilot notified the ATCT that "we're gonna need to come back now we've got a problem here." The controller cleared the airplane to enter right traffic for runway 26 and asked if the pilot need emergency assistance. At 1921:32, the pilot replied "negative" on the assistance. At 1921:33, the controller stated, "Premier five zero papa mike they put a hold message on your flight plan that way you can reuse it if you want to go later just let me know." At 1921:39, the pilot replied, "sounds good appreciate it." At 1922:42, the flight was issued landing clearance and traffic to follow. At 1922:51, the pilot replied, "cleared to land number two fifty five mike thank you," which was the last recording from the airplane to the ATCT. From 1922:53 until the end of the recording, several GPWS audible warnings were given including "pull up pull up pull up" and the pilot stating "I don't know what that's sayin." The airplane crashed while on the downwind leg for runway 26. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane, and he held a type rating in the accident airplane. He held a third-class medical certificate which was issued on April 17, 2013 and contained restriction, "76 – not valid for any class after." At the time of that medical examination, the pilot reported 7,700 total hours of flight experience and 35 hours of flight experience within the preceding 6 months. The pilot further reported, on the medical certificate application, that he was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and had had a heart attack in April 1996, which was treated with angioplasty and stent placement. The pilot's stress test, conducted on April 11, 2013, revealed no evidence of ischemia. He further reported that his medications included aspirin, atenolol, losartan, and simvastatin. According to the FAA medical case review, the pilot's reported medication of Atenolol and losartan were used to treat high blood pressure and were marketed as Tenormin and Cozaar. Simvastatin was a cholesterol lowering medication marketed as Zocar and Aspirin is a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication used to treat pain and fever, it also inhibits blood clots and helps prevent occlusion of the coronary arteries. According to information provided by the pilot's company representative, the pilot's most recent logbook entry was dated June 27, 2013. At that time he had accumulated a total of 7,200.6 hours total flight experience, of those hours 1,030.1 hours of flight experience in "Jet;" however, it could not be accurately determined how many of those hours were in the accident aircraft make and model. A search was conducted on the passenger and revealed no evidence of any FAA pilot or medical certification. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records the airplane, Serial No. RB-80, was issued an airworthiness certificate on September 20, 2003 and was registered to the corporation on November 7, 2003 as N50280. The registration number was changed to N50PM on December 24, 2003. The corporate registration listed the accident pilot as the president. It was equipped with two Williams-Rolls FJ44-2A engines. The left engine, also known as engine No. 1, serial number 105067, was placarded for 2,300 pounds of thrust. The right engine, also known as engine No. 2, serial number 105070, was placarded for 2,300 pounds of thrust. According to maintenance records dated December 16, 2013, four (4) maintenance items were recorded and signed off as completed. At the time of the entry, a recorded hobbs was 712.9 hours. On December 23, 2011 a recorded "A" airframe inspection was accomplished with a reported total time of 621.2 flight hours. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe 1940 recorded weather observation at FTY, was considered a "Speci" and included wind from 230 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 12 degrees C, dew point 01 degrees C, and barometric altimeter 30.13 inches of mercury. The 1853 recorded weather observation at FTY included wind from 240 at 4 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 13 C, dew point 0 C, and barometric altimeter 30.13 inches of mercury. According to the U.S. Naval Observatory, on the day of the accident, official sunset was at 1731, the end of civil twilight was at 1759, and official moonrise was at 1808. The moon phase was full. AIRPORT INFORMATIONAccording to FAA records the airplane, Serial No. RB-80, was issued an airworthiness certificate on September 20, 2003 and was registered to the corporation on November 7, 2003 as N50280. The registration number was changed to N50PM on December 24, 2003. The corporate registration listed the accident pilot as the president. It was equipped with two Williams-Rolls FJ44-2A engines. The left engine, also known as engine No. 1, serial number 105067, was placarded for 2,300 pounds of thrust. The right engine, also known as engine No. 2, serial number 105070, was placarded for 2,300 pounds of thrust. According to maintenance records dated December 16, 2013, four (4) maintenance items were recorded and signed off as completed. At the time of the entry, a recorded hobbs was 712.9 hours. On December 23, 2011 a recorded "A" airframe inspection was accomplished with a reported total time of 621.2 flight hours. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe main portion of the airplane came to rest upright and in a moderately wooded area within a drainage ditch. An impact crater was located approximately 45 feet from the main wreckage along the debris path. Within the crater was the windscreen section, and the No. 1 (left pilot side) window was spider-webbed but remained intact. The wreckage was located about 3 miles on a 043 degree course from the threshold of runway 26 and came to rest facing toward the direction of travel. The debris path was approximately 250 feet in length and on a heading of 095 degrees. The initial tree strike location was located approximately 80 feet above ground level (agl) and consisted of the left wingtip including the navigation light. The second tree impact location was located approximately 50 feet agl and consisted of the right wingtip including the navigation light. The initial ground impact point, along the debris path, contained the tailcone, a portion of the right wing, elevator, outboard approximate 4 feet of the left wing aileron, and an inboard gear door location. The GPS location of the main wreckage, which consisted of the right wing, horizontal stabilizer, both engines, nose landing gear and both main landing gear was 33°49.028' N, 084°28.147' W. The wreckage was also located at 867 feet above mean sea level. Seven of the eight flap actuators were observed. Two actuators were located attached to the wing, and five of the actuators were found within the debris field. One of those had a handwritten "L.I." inscribed on it and another one had "L.O." inscribed on it. One "long" actuator could not be located. The measurements on the four "long" actuators measured, from the faceplate to the center of the attachment bolt, 7, 7 ¼, 7 ¼ and 7 ½ inches respectively and on one actuator, the eyelet containing the attachment bolt was not recovered, the measurement was of the exposed cylinder which measured 6 inches. The fifth "long" actuator measurement could not be conclusively determined due to impact damage. The measurement on one of the two "short" actuators measured 4 1/4 inches. The other "short" actuator measurement could not be conclusively determined due to impact damage. All obtained measurements corresponded to an approximate 10 degree flap position. Nose Section The nose of the airplane exhibited thermal damage and was impact fractured; the weather radar was located near the main wreckage. The impact resulted in a complete breach of the nose section. The nose landing gear was impact-separated at the top section of the trunion. A portion of the forward baggage door was located in the initial ground crater as well as near the main wreckage location. Right Wing The right wing exhibited thermal and impact damage. The fuel cap was separated from the fuel fill hole. The cap was thermally damaged; however, the cap was found with the locking tab recessed and in the locked position. The inboard and outboard flaps remained attached to the wing and exhibited thermal and impact damage. The right main landing gear oleo strut remained attached to the tire; however, it was thermally damaged. The right main landing gear actuator was separated from the gear and found in the wreckage. The actuator was thermally damaged. The actuator piston extension was measured and found to be extended approximately 21 inches, which corresponded to the landing gear in the full extended/down position. The right wing blow down actuator was in the full retracted position The cylinder was intact and thermally damaged and the unit remained attached to the respective ends. The roll/speedbrake/spoiler actuator piston was extended 3 ½ inches which correlated to a nearly fully extended position. The right lift dump actuator was not observed. Empennage and Fuselage The empennage, which was a composite and aluminum structure, was thermally destroyed. The elevator and rudder cables were located throughout the main wreckage and continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the rudder horn and elevator aft lower bellcrank. The aileron cables were located and were intact and continuity was confirmed to the base of the control column to the aft sector bellcrank; however, the swedged end of the cable was pulled through the attachment point on the bellcrank in the left wing. The CVR was located within the empennage wreckage. The horizontal stabilizer was located on top of the right wing and inverted. The emergency exit was located and thermally damaged; the locking pins were extended and appeared to have been secured prior to the accident sequence. The main cabin door was located in the ground impact crater and the door pins were extended. The rudder was thermally damaged and only the rudder torque tube was located. The center wing section was thermally damaged. The hydraulic spoiler control unit was heat damaged. Right Engine The right engine was located within the main wreckage area and under the main cabin section. It was thermally damaged; however, no penetration was noted. The spinner was thermally damaged and the leading tip was melted. The fan would not rotate due to thermal and impact damage; 8 of the blades were noted to have curling on the tips or cuts in the blades. The fan stator exhibited evidence of impact, thermal, and debris damage and also had numerous areas of foreign obstacle ingestion damage, which likely occurred during ground impact. The interstage housing, forward and aft by-pass ducts were thermally destroyed. The throttle arm remained attached, the arm operated along a 20 degree arc and an exact throttle position could not be determined. The fuel filter remained attached to the engine housing. The fuel filter was removed and no evidence of foreign debris was noted. The fuel filter was located under the main cabin section of the aircraft. The hydraulic surge protector remained attached to the engine and oil was present. The exciter boxes and bleed valve remained attached. The bleed valve appeared to be in the open position. All six ITT probes remained attached to the 1st low pressure nozzle. The three chip detectors were located and secured in the engine. The detectors were removed and appeared to be free of foreign material. The engine was disassembled and no abnormalities or malfunctions were noted. For detailed information of the engine exam refer to the "Right Engine Examination" report located in the public docket with this accident. Left Engine The left engine was located in the main wreckage area. It was thermally damaged; however, no penetration was noted. The fan would not rotate due to thermal and impact damage. The fan stator exhibited evidence impact, thermal, and debris damage also had numerous areas of foreign obstacle ingestion damage, which likely occurred during ground impact. The interstage housing was thermally destroyed. The throttle arm was located in the near full throttle posi

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control while maneuvering the airplane in the traffic pattern at night. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment from the use of illicit drugs.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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