Naples, FL, USA
N22NA
NORTH AMERICAN T 6G
According to the airline transport pilot, during the initial climb for the personal flight, when the airplane was about 150 to 250 ft above the ground, the engine lost all power. He lowered the landing gear, maintained flying airspeed, and then landed the airplane in the grass right of the runway. The airplane subsequently collided with a runway distance remaining sign and came to a stop. The pilot reported that there were 113 gallons of fuel on board the airplane at takeoff, and postaccident examination revealed that there was an adequate supply of fuel in the fuel tanks. However, during examination of the engine fuel system components, no fuel was found in the fuel line from the outlet of the mechanical fuel pump to the fuel flow transducer nor at the carburetor inlet fitting, consistent with fuel starvation. Further examination of the engine and remaining components of the fuel system revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure, and the reason for the fuel interruption to the engine could not be determined.
On October 23, 2014, about 1235 eastern daylight time, a North American T-6G, N22NA, was force landed following a total loss of engine power during initial climb at Naples Municipal Airport, Naples, Florida (APF). The airline transport pilot was not injured and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Bill Leff Airshows LLC and was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated from APF and was destined for Leesburg, Florida (LEE).The pilot reported that during the initial climb, with the right fuel tank selected, and between 150 to 250 feet above the ground, the engine lost all power. He lowered the landing gear, maintained flying airspeed, and landed the airplane in the grass, to the right of the runway. The airplane collided with a runway distance remaining sign and came to a stop. The pilot turned off the magnetos, electrical master switch, and exited the airplane through the cockpit canopy. He later reported that there were 113 gallons of fuel on board at the time of the takeoff. An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responded to the accident site and examined the wreckage. The fuselage, left wing, and right wing root exhibited structural damage from impact forces. The propeller was bent aft and the engine remained attached at the firewall. The engine crankshaft turned freely when the propeller was rotated manually. The fuel tanks contained an adequate supply of fuel. The airplane to a hangar at APF, and an initial examination was performed. The inspection revealed the left main landing gear strut was fractured at the trunnion, and damage to the upper wing skin above the right main landing gear strut was noted consistent with upward displacement of the landing gear. The left wing spar was fractured about 3 feet outboard of the landing gear light. Throttle, mixture, and propeller control continuity was confirmed from the cockpit controls to their respective attach points at the engine. Inspection of the front and rear seat fuel selector handles revealed both were positioned to the left tank position. The fuel selector shaft from the front seat was separated from the handle; the rivets were fractured. With the forward fuel selector positioned to the left tank position, the fractured rivets/shaft aligned. The fuel selector transmission for the front/rear seat fuel selector was displaced slightly from its normal position. Movement of the propeller confirmed continuity to both magnetos. The oil tank contained oil. No fuel was noted at the inlet fitting of the auxiliary fuel pump, and about 11 ounces of fuel, blue in color and consistent with 100 low lead, were drained from the fuel strainer. Approximately 3 ounces of blue-colored fuel consistent with 100 low lead was drained from the fuel line from the fuel strainer outlet to the mechanical fuel pump inlet. No fuel was found in the fuel line from the outlet of the mechanic fuel pump to the fuel flow transducer, and no fuel was found at the carburetor inlet fitting. Powertrain continuity was confirmed to the engine-driven fuel pump drive pad. The engine-driven fuel pump was removed and the drive gear appeared normal. There was no damage to the gear teeth and the pump turned freely. The auxiliary fuel pump was removed and separated from the electric motor. The drive splines of the pump were normal in appearance. The pump portion of the auxiliary fuel pump and the engine-driven fuel pump without the drive gear were retained for testing. All forward spark plugs were removed and all exhibited normal wear, gap, and color when compared to a Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug chart; no damage was noted to the center electrodes. Inspection of the forward seat fuel selector valve revealed it was between detents and the fuel selector handle moved freely. Continuity of the front seat fuel selector to the transmission was confirmed from the separation point near the handle, and for the rear seat from the selector to the transmission. The shaft from the outlet of the transmission to the fuel selector valve located in the left wing was separated at the transmission; the shaft was noted to be bent. The position of the fuel selector shaft at the fuel selector in relation to the valve was marked with permanent marker, and was noted to be slightly out of the detent near the right tank position. A subsequent examination of the fuel selector valve revealed it was near the right tank detent. Air was blown from the right port to the outlet in the as-found position and no obstructions were noted. The valve was then positioned to the right tank detent and air moved thru the valve. The fuel selector valve was unable to be flow tested as the threads for the right tank and outlet fittings would not easily accept the test bench hoses. Marks were made on the valve housing and cover for alignment purposes. Disassembly of the fuel selector in the as-found position revealed the hole from the right tank position nearly aligned with the tank port. The conical shaped seal was comprised of a white colored hard material, and there was no obvious slippage of conical seal to the valve shaft. The auxiliary fuel pump and engine-driven fuel pump were removed and taken to a FAA-certified repair station for testing. Both fuel pumps were placed on a test stand as received, which utilized PD680 Type II fluid. The inlet and outlet fittings of both pumps had -10 fittings installed, and the test stand was equipped with a -12 line for the inlet and a -8 line for the outlet. Appropriate size adapters were installed at the pump inlet and outlet fittings to accommodate the different test bench hose sizes. The engine-driven fuel pump was placed on the test bench first and was operated at the following rpm settings with the following results in terms of gallons-per-hour (gph) noted. During testing, 9 drops in 30 seconds leakage was noted from the drain fitting. The no-flow fuel pressure setting was 5.11 pounds per square inch (psi). At 2,000 rpm, a fuel flow of 57.8 gph was observed. At 2,500 rpm, 59.7 gph was observed and the fuel pressure was 4.37 psi. The auxiliary fuel pump was placed on a test bench with similar adapters and tested at the same rpm settings as the engine-driven fuel pump. During the testing, 1 drop per second leakage was noted from the outlet fitting, with the line appropriately torqued. A damaged thread prevented proper sealing. The no-flow fuel pressure setting was 9.8 psi. During testing no drops was noted from the drain fitting. At 2,000 rpm, a fuel flow of 89.5 gph was observed. At 2,500 rpm, 91.3 gph was observed and the fuel pressure was 8 psi. According to the Pratt and Whitney Handbook of Operation and Flight Instructions for the R-1340-AN1 engine (page 14), normal fuel consumption at climb and high speed (2,200 rpm) was approximately 55 gph. The airplane was equipped with a JP Instruments EDM 700 engine monitoring system. The unit was forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Division for examination and data retrieval. The EDM recording contained approximately 15.6 hours of data over 20 power cycles from September 19, 2014 through October 23, 2014. The event flight was the last flight of the recording and its duration was approximately 13 minutes. The recording included device time and date, exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and cylinder head temperature (CHT) for cylinders 1-9, peak EGT delta, CHT cooling rate, and battery voltage. No other parameters were recorded in any of the data reviewed. EGT from cylinder 7 did not record valid data during the accident flight. The data showed a grouping of EGT and CHT, except for cylinder 6, which was a low outlier to the data. The EGT and CHT parameters were at a stabilized condition after engine start and warm up. EGT and CHT from cylinder 6 were 255 and 82 degrees C, respectively, about 325 degrees C and 70 degrees C less than the mean of the other cylinders. EGT in the other cylinders ranged from 551 to 678 degrees C, while CHT ranged from 129 to 173 degrees C at that time. From the stabilized point, EGT and CHT began to increase in all cylinders, consistent with an increase in engine power. Subsequently, cylinder 6 EGT jumped to be in the range of the other cylinders, ranging from 747 to 804 degrees C, and cylinder 6 CHT began converging with the other cylinders. EGT and CHT parameters in all cylinders decreased until the end of the recording, consistent with a reduction in engine power. Following inspection of the wreckage, the owner was advised that a cursory inspection of the accident site area and the associated damaged marker sign was performed. The owner stated that he did not feel that the impacted sign was frangible based on the damage to the left wing. Further examination of the hardware by the manufacturer revealed that the parts failed as expected; the frangible couplings were fractured at the base.
The total loss of engine power during the initial climb due to fuel starvation for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine fuel system components revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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