Andrews, TX, USA
N29AC
BEECH A36
The commercial pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. Before departure, the pilot received a weather briefing, which called for icing conditions below 12,000 ft for an area that encompassed the destination airport. The pilot reported that he contacted the air route traffic controller to request an area navigation global positioning system (RNAV GPS) approach. Before initiating the approach, the pilot listened to the destination airport's current automated weather observation. After the controller cleared the approach, the airplane descended through a 200- to 300-ft-thick cloud layer and then broke out of the clouds about 700 to 800 ft above ground level with the runway in sight. The airplane was descending a little more quickly than desired, so the pilot added full power, and, even though the engine sounded fine, the descent rate continued. The airplane contacted the ground about 3,000 ft short of the runway, less than 1 minute from the time it descended out of the clouds. An on-scene examination of the airplane revealed 1/4- to 1/2-inch-thick ice on the leading edge of the wings, vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, windscreen, and several antennas on the fuselage. The air traffic controller did not verify, as required, that the pilot had the current local weather information so verification by the controller likely would not have affected the pilot's decision to land at the destination airport. Further, although the controller did not solicit nor distribute a pilot report to the accident pilot or the pilot in the airplane that landed just before the accident airplane, the pilot had received information in his weather briefing indicating that icing was possible in the area.
On February 5, 2015, at 0048 central standard time, a Beech A36 airplane, N29AC, collided with the terrain while landing at the Andrews County Airport (E11), Andrews Texas. The commercial pilot and one passenger received serious injuries. The remaining two passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, which was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the Mid Valley Airpark (E98), Los Lunas, New Mexico, at 2341. The pilot reported they originally departed California and made an en route stop at E98. While on the ground at E98, he obtained a direct user access terminal service (DUATS) weather briefing and departed shortly thereafter. The pilot reported that while en route, around Roswell, New Mexico, a thin layer of clouds began to appear below his altitude. At 0016, the pilot communicated with the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZFW) that he was going to request the area navigation global positioning system (RNAV GPS) runway 16 approach at E11. The pilot then requested and received the 2353 weather observation for his alternate airport, Midland International Airport (MAF). The pilot did not request, nor was the E11 weather observation given to the pilot. The pilot was informed that there was another airplane on the approach in front of him, and he was cleared to descend and maintain 7,000 ft at the pilot's discretion. About one minute later, the controller advised the pilot that the other airplane had canceled their IFR flight plan and that he was now cleared to descend and maintain 6,000 ft. The pilot was then cleared for the RNAV GPS runway 16 approach. At 0039, the controller confirmed with the pilot that he was at the HWSER fix and advised the pilot that radar services were terminated, he could change to the advisory frequency, and to cancel his IFR flight plan on the ground. The pilot reported that when they were close to the airport, with the landing gear and flaps extended, they descended through a 200 to 300 ft thick cloud layer breaking out of the clouds at 700 to 800 ft above ground level with the runway in sight. He stated the airplane was descending a little quicker than desired so he added full power and even though the engine sounded fine, the descent rate continued. The pilot stated that the airplane contacted the ground in less than a minute from the time it descended out of the clouds. The airplane contacted the terrain about 3,000 ft short of the approach end of runway 16 and traveled about 1,000 ft before coming to rest. An initial postaccident examination of the airplane revealed ¼ to ½ inch of ice was present on the leading edge of the wings, vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, the windscreen, and several antennas on the fuselage. The pilot reported that there was no indication of icing conditions from the DUATS weather briefing, the E11 automated weather observing system (AWOS) which he listened to prior to initiating the approach, or from air traffic control. The pilot stated he did not see any visible ice on the side window or on the inboard portion of the wing when he checked it during the descent through the clouds. Weather Information A copy of the DUATS weather briefing that the pilot received contained AIRMET ZULU which was valid at the time of the accident and encompassed E11. The AIRMET called for moderate ice below 12,000 ft. At 2355, the E11 Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) observation reported wind from 020 degrees at 16 knots gusting to 19 knots, visibility 4 statute miles with mist, ceiling 700 ft overcast, temperature minus 1 degree Celsius, dewpoint minus 1 degree Celsius, altimeter 30.37 inches of mercury. At 0055, the E11 METAR observation reported wind from 010 degrees at 11 knots, visibility 5 statute miles with mist, ceiling 700 ft overcast, temperature minus 1 degree Celsius, dewpoint minus 2 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.39 inches of mercury. At 2353, the MAF METAR observation, located 29 miles southeast of the accident site, reported wind from 020 degrees at 15 knots, visibility 9 statute miles, ceiling 800 ft overcast, temperature 0 degrees Celsius, dewpoint minus 2 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.36 inches of mercury. Remarks included peak wind from 020 degrees at 27 knots at 2317 and a ceiling of 600 ft variable 1,100 ft. Air Traffic Control Services The MAF approach control facility closed at 0000 at which time ZFW assumed their approach control responsibilities, which included E11. The responsibilities include the requirement to provide approach information to aircraft destined to airports for which they provide approach control services. FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 4-7-10, Approach Information, states in part: a. en route and terminal approach control sectors must provide current approach information to aircraft destined to airports for which they provide approach control services. This information must be provided on initial contact or as soon as possible thereafter. Approach information contained in the ATIS broadcast may be omitted if the pilot states the appropriate ATIS code. For pilots destined to an airport without ATIS, items 3-5 below may be omitted after the pilot advises receipt of the automated weather; otherwise, issue approach information by including the following: 1. Approach clearance or type approach to be expected if two or more approaches are published and the clearance limit does not indicate which will be used. 2. Runway if different from that to which the instrument approach is made. 3. Surface wind. 4. Ceiling and visibility if the reported ceiling at the airport of intended landing is below 1,000 feet or below the highest circling minimum, whichever is greater, or the visibility is less than 3 miles. 5. Altimeter setting for the airport of intended landing. b. Upon pilot request, controllers must inform pilots of the frequency where automated weather data may be obtained and, if appropriate, that airport weather is not available. Although the pilot reported that he did listen to the E11 AWOS prior to beginning the approach, the ZFW controller who was providing approach control services did not ensure that the pilot had the current weather information for E11. FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-6-2, PIREP INFORMATION states in part: Significant PIREP information includes reports of strong frontal activity, squall lines, thunderstorms, light to severe icing, wind shear and turbulence (including clear air turbulence) of moderate or greater intensity, volcanic eruptions and volcanic ash clouds, detection of sulfur gases (SO2 or H2S) in the cabin, and other conditions pertinent to flight safety. a. Solicit PIREPs when requested or when one of the following conditions exists or is forecast for your area of jurisdiction: 1. Ceilings at or below 5,000 feet. These PIREPs must include cloud base/top reports when feasible. TERMINAL. Ensure that at least one descent/climb- out PIREP, including cloud base/s, top/s, and other related phenomena, is obtained each hour. EN ROUTE. When providing approach control services, the requirements stated in TERMINAL above apply. 2. Visibility (surface or aloft) at or less than 5 miles. 3. Thunderstorms and related phenomena. 4. Turbulence of moderate degree or greater. 5. Icing of light degree or greater. 6. Wind shear. 7. Volcanic ash clouds. NOTE- Pilots may forward PIREPs regarding volcanic activity using the format described in the Volcanic Activity Reporting Form (VAR) as depicted in the AIM, Appendix 2. 8. Detection of sulfur gases (SO2 or H2S), associated with volcanic activity, in the cabin. NOTE- The smell of sulfur gases in the cockpit may indicate volcanic activity that has not yet been detected or reported and/or possible entry into an ash- bearing cloud. SO2 is identifiable as the sharp, acrid odor of a freshly struck match. H2 S has the odor of rotten eggs. 9. TERMINAL. Braking Action Advisories are in effect. b. Record with the PIREPs: 1. Time. 2. Aircraft position. 3. Type aircraft. 4. Altitude. 5. When the PIREP involves icing include: (a) Icing type and intensity. (b) Air temperature in w hich icing is occurring. c. Obtain PIREPs directly from the pilot, or if the PIREP has been requested by another facility, you may instruct the pilot to deliver it directly to that facility. Weather information which included the icing and freezing level information was provided and available to the ZFW controllers via the supervisors console at each sector/area in the center. The weather conditions at E11 met the criteria for the controller to solicit a PIREP from arriving and departing aircraft. The controller did not solicite PIREP information from either the airplane that landed just prior to the accident airplane or from the accident pilot.
The pilot's failure to note that icing conditions existed in the airport area despite having received that information in a preflight briefing, which resulted in his flight into an area of icing and the subsequent loss of airplane control due to ice accumulation on the airplane.
Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database
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