Aviation Accident Summaries

Aviation Accident Summary OPS17IA021

New Orleans, LA, USA

Aircraft #1

N520ER

CESSNA 172S

Aircraft #2

N43WW

PIPER PA 32R-301

Analysis

The incident sequence began after N43WW departed runway 36 right and was instructed to enter right closed traffic and N520ER reported east of the Lakefront Airport for landing. The air traffic control services provided by the control tower operator caused the incident. The services provided during the sequencing and spacing of the two aircraft landing on the runway were not in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order (FAA JO) 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, directives. When the pilot of the N520ER reported 6.5 nautical miles east of the airport, the air traffic controller instructed the pilot to enter a right base for runway 36 right. N43WW was already established in the downwind for runway 36 right, both aircraft were maneuvering for runway 36R and no instruction or traffic advisories were issued by ATC to ensure sequencing and spacing to the runway. The pilot of N520ER initiated a go around and subsequently overflew N43WW which was on landing rollout on the runway. The closest proximity between the two aircraft on final approach was estimated to be about 516 feet. The FAA JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-8-1 requires air traffic controllers to establish a sequence of landing traffic to avoid collisions at the runway and to ensure proper spacing. Additionally, when the conflict alert activated, the controller did not issue a required safety alert or traffic advisory for the conflict.

Factual Information

On May 9, 2017, at about 1629 central daylight time, a near midair collision (NMAC) occurred at Lakefront Airport (NEW), New Orleans, Louisiana, when a C-172, N520ER, came into close proximity of PA-32, N43WW, after both aircraft were maneuvering to land on the same runway. The NMAC occurred about 0.45 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold of runway 36 right (36R), and when N520ER initiated a go-around, the aircraft overflew N43WW while on landing rollout on runway 36R. N43WW had been operating in right closed traffic to runway 36R and N520ER had been issued a right base entry to runway 36R. Both airplanes were operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 with air traffic control (ATC) services being provided by the NEW airport traffic control tower (ATCT). There was no damage to either airplane and no injuries reported. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed.   History of Flight A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ATC radar and voice data revealed that at 1618:02 the pilot of N43WW contacted the NEW ATCT LC and advised they were ready for takeoff. The LC cleared the pilot for takeoff from runway 36R and instructed the pilot to enter "right closed traffic." Radar data indicated the aircraft became airborne at about 1619:08. At 1625:06, the pilot of N520ER contacted the LC and reported 6.5 nm east of NEW inbound for the traffic pattern. The LC instructed the pilot to enter a right base for runway 36R; the pilot correctly acknowledged the instructions. At 1627:38, the LC cleared N520ER "for the option" and instructed the pilot to enter right closed traffic when on the go. The pilot acknowledged the instructions. Meanwhile, N43WW was turning on a right crosswind runway 36R. At 1629:29, when N43WW was crossing the runway 9 extended centerline, the pilot began to turn a base leg for runway 36R. At 1629:32, the conflict alert (CA) activated in the tower with an aural and visual alert between N520ER and N43WW indicating there was a potential conflict between the two aircraft. At 1630:03, the pilot of N520ER advised the LC that he was initiating a go around because there was an "aircraft landing runway 36 right." The LC responded by instructing the pilot of N520ER to "…go around." At 1630:29, the LC instructed the pilot of N43WW to "stay on the ground." The pilot of N43WW acknowledged the instruction. There were no further pertinent transmissions with either aircraft related to this incident. Airport and Radar Data Radar data for this report was obtained from the FAA New Orleans terminal radar approach control (MSY) located in Kenner, Louisiana. The NEW plot playback (. PPB) data was of good quality and was part of the standard terminal automation replacement system (STARS) utilized by air traffic control. The NEW ATCT is equipped with a tower display workstation (TDW) that presents a "slaved" picture from the MSY radar. Figure 1 illustrates the. PPB radar data of both aircraft as they approached the runway 36R threshold and the subsequent pilot initiated go around of N520ER. Figure 2 illustrates the radar data of N520ER and N43WW as the pilot of N520ER initiated a go around after N43WW descended while on a right base leg turn to final at about 0.45 NM from the runway 36R threshold. The closest proximity was estimated to be about 516 feet based off radar data. Figure 1 - Radar data illustrating the radar plots of both incident aircraft. Figure 2 – Close in radar plots of both aircraft when the NMAC occurred. Weather Information At 1553, the NEW automated weather observation recorded wind from 340° at 08 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 4,900 ft. above ground level (agl), temperature 28° C, dew point 18 C°, altimeter setting 30.07 inches of mercury. Air Traffic Directives Air Traffic Directives Duty Priority         FAA Joint Order (JO) 7110.65(W), Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-1-2 addresses an air traffic controller's operational duty priority and states [in part]: 2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts as required in this order. Good judgment must be used in prioritizing all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the situation at hand. Sequence/Spacing Application FAA JO 7110.65(W), Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-8-1, "Sequencing/Spacing Application," addressed the procedures for controllers to utilize when sequencing and spacing multiple aircraft. The paragraph stated in part: 3-8-1. SEQUENCE/SPACING APPLICATION Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight or ground operation, as necessary, to achieve proper spacing. PHRASEOLOGY- CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF. CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF OR HOLD SHORT/HOLD IN POSITION/TAXI OFF THE RUNWAY (traffic). EXTEND DOWNWIND. MAKE SHORT APPROACH. NUMBER (landing sequence number), FOLLOW (description and location of traffic), or if traffic is utilizing another runway, TRAFFIC (description and location) LANDING RUNWAY (number of runway being used). Same Runway Separation FAA JO 7110.65 (W), Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-10-3, "Same Runway Separation," addressed same runway separation for air traffic controllers to utilize when multiple aircraft are landing the same runway. The paragraph stated in part: 3-10-3. SAME RUNWAY SEPARATION a. Separate an arriving aircraft from another aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that the arriving aircraft does not cross the landing threshold until one of the following conditions exists or unless authorized in para 3-10-10, Altitude Restricted Low Approach. 1. The other aircraft has landed and is clear of the runway. Between sunrise and sunset, if you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks and the other aircraft has landed, it need not be clear of the runway if the following minimum distance from the landing threshold exists: (a) When a Category I aircraft is landing behind a Category I or II- 3,000 feet. Safety Alert              The FAA defines conflict alert as "A function of certain air traffic control automated systems designed to alert radar controllers to existing or pending situations between tracked targets (known IFR or VFR aircraft) that require his/her immediate attention/action." FAA JO 7110.65 (W), Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-1-6 addresses Safety alerts and states [in part]:                    b.  Aircraft Conflict/Mode C Intruder Alert.             Immediately issue/initiate an alert to an aircraft if you are aware of another aircraft at an altitude that you believe places them in unsafe proximity. If feasible, offer the pilot an alternate course of action. When an alternate course of action is given, end the transmission with the word "immediately."                    PHRASEOLOGY-               TRAFFIC ALERT (call sign) (position of aircraft) ADVISE YOU TURN LEFT/RIGHT (heading),                     and/or                    CLIMB/DESCEND (specific altitude if appropriate) IMMEDIATELY.                    EXAMPLE-                     "Traffic Alert, Cessna Three Four Juliet, 12'o clock, 1 mile advise you turn left immediately."                         or                     "Traffic Alert, Cessna Three-Four Juliet, 12'o clock, 1 mile advise you turn left and climb immediately." ?

Probable Cause and Findings

The air traffic controller not following Federal Aviation Administration directives to establish sequencing and spacing between aircraft operating to the same runway.

 

Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database

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